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CASE COMMENTS
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND ERRONEOUS DECISION
DISTINGUISHED*
Jurisdiction and collateral attack have long been recognized as
being among the more uncertain propositions in the law.1 These
two fundamental concepts were again demonstrated to be susceptible
of varying interpretations in a recent Illinois decision.2
The case of Collins v. Collins3 presents the somewhat anomalous sit-
uation of a plaintiff seeking to vacate a divorce decree which she herself
had originally obtained. In the initial divorce proceeding, an uncon-
tested action in the circuit court of Cook County, the chancellor dis-
solved plaintiff's nineteen-month-old marriage to William Collins on
the ground of his habitual drunkenness, although the parties had not
been married two years, a prerequisite to divorce on the ground.4 Nev-
ertheless, this decree was not challenged until Mrs. Collins' second hus-
band, whom she had married approximately two weeks after her
"divorce" from William Collins, sought to have his marriage to Mrs.
Collins annulled on the ground that the first marriage was still valid.
In dissolving this second marriage, the superior court ruled that the
initial divorce decree granted to Mrs. Collins by the circuit court was
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter since it affirma-
tively appeared from the complaint that the parties had not been mar-
ried two years. After this decision, Mrs. Collins filed a petition to have
the circuit court vacate its previous decree. It is interesting to note
that William Collins, plaintiff's first husband, had died and his heirs,
*Ed. Note: The citation to the principal case in the advance sheets was i5o
N.E.2d 361; however, the case appears in the bound Northeastern 2d Reporter in
volume 151, page 813. This discrepancy is apparently due to a modification of the
opinion which occurred at the time that the petition for rehearing was denied and
which probably delayed delivery of the revised, final opinion to the West Publish-
ing Company. This comment is based on the case as it appeared in the advance
sheets; hence citations to the principal case do not correspond to the case as it is re-
ported in the permanent volume. The official citation is 14 Ill. 2d 178 (1958).
"It has been well said that there is perhaps, no word or legal terminology so
frequently used as the word 'jurisdiction,' so capable of use in a general and vague
sense, and which is used so often by men learned in the law without a due regard
to precision in its application." Friend v. Northern Trust Co., 314 Ill. App. 596, 42
N.E.2d 330, 334 (1942). "It is safe to say that there is no proposition of the law that
is involved in more doubt and affected with greater variety of judicial opinion than
the subject of collateral attack upon judicial proceedings." I Bailey, Jurisdiction
§ 165a (1899).
2Collins v. Collins, 15o N.E.2d 361 (1958). [This citation is to the opinion which
appeared in the advance sheets. Permanent citation is 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958).]
31 bid.
'Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4o § 1 (1955).
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who had their interests in the deceased's estate to protect, were sub-
stituted as defendants, in this action by Mrs. Collins. The circuit court
found it had been without jurisdiction in the original divorce action
and vacated the decree. Although the appellate court disagreed and
reversed the circuit court's finding,5 the Illinois Supreme Court over-
turned the appellate court's ruling and affirmed the holding of the
circuit court. Hence the final result is that Mrs. Collins has the same
status she would have had if she had never instituted any divorce suit;
that is, she is the widow of William Collins.6
In the principal case the majority found that the insertion in the
record of the dates of marriage and filing of the decree resulted in an
affirmative showing of no jurisdiction over the subject matter.7 These
specific allegations8 of dates were held to prevent any possibility that
jurisdiction had attached in the original action, for anyone examining
the record could determine by these patently insufficient pleadings that
the court below did not have the power to hear the case.9 The majority
apparently considered the sufficiency of the pleadings as a condition
precedent to the existence of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Such
a position has been upheld by several courts;10 however, the viewpoint
'In all proceedings with reference to the principal case, the circuit court of
Cook County was the trial court. It was this court which originally granted Mrs.
Collins her divorce and which, upon the petition of Mrs. Collins, vacated its pre-
vious decree in the principal action. The appellate court, an intermediate court in
the Illinois court system, reversed the action of the trial court in the principal case;
however, it was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court, the highest court of Illinois.
The other court mentioned in this comment is the superior court of Cook County
which annulled the second marriage of Mrs. Collins.
OIt is impossible to ascertain to what degree, if any, the opinions were in-
fluenced by the property settlement involved in the present case. The dissent did not
even mention this consideration. The majority did not allow the property awards
in the original action to constitute an estoppel in the principal proceeding. s5o
N.E.2d at 365. [In the revised opinion the dissent did contend that plaintiff
in the present action should be estopped by her acceptance of the property settle-
ment in the original divorce proceeding. 14 Ill. 2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813, 818 (1958).]
715o N.E.2d at 364.
8The majority stated that a general allegation, without more, would have been
sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Ibid. The reasoning apparently was that
such general allegations do not evidence a lack of jurisdiction from the face of the
record.
OThe classical description of jurisdiction over the subject matter has been in
terms of power of the court to decide a case. Foltz v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 6o Fed.
316 (8th Cir. 1894); Manley v. Park, 62 Kan. 553, 64 Pac. 28 (igoi); People ex rel.
Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263, 59 Am. Dec. 536 (1853). "Jurisdiciton is simply
power." Van Fleet, The Law of Collateral Attack on Judicial Proceedings § 70 (1892).
w'There are cases holding that where a court, even of general jurisdiction, is
exercising a limited statutory power, and a statute conferring the power declares
that it may be exercised upon the presentation of a petition stating certain facts,
[Vol. XVI
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of the dissent appears to be the more prevalent one. The dissent
denied any interdependence of pleading and jurisdiction and argued
that the jurisdiction of the circuit court in the Collins case was unaf-
fected by the adequacy of the pleadings. 1 In other words, the minority
was not concerned that the dates alleged in the pleadings showed the
parties had not been married two years; it was satisfied that jurisdic-
tion had attached from a complaint which set forth, though imper-
fectly, a statutory ground for divorce.
12
One of the most frequently stated descriptions of jurisdiction over
the subject matter is jurisdiction over the general class of cases to
which the case at bar belongs.13 Such a definition could validly be
attacked as the use of an ambiguity to clear up an ambiguity. The
difficulty is a proper determination of what is meant by "general class
of cases." This problem plagued both the majority and the minority
in the Collins case. The majority evidently felt it meant "each divorce
action as qualified by its particular statutory conditions."'14 Under such
a view, if desertion for one year were a statutory divorce ground, any
specific allegation which showed that the time requirement was not
fulfilled would mean the court had never had jurisdiction, because
any case on the ground of desertion for less than one year was never
within the "general class of cases" which the court could decide.
There is support for this position,'5 but the more liberal interpreta-
the failure to allege such facts is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court and renders
its judgment and orders in the proceeding void, even on collateral attack." In re
Hughes, 159 Cal. 360, 113 Pac. 684, 687 (1911). Cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 137 W. Va.
179, 70 S.E.2d 894 (1952); 27 C.J.S. Divorce § ioS (1941).
"1See In re Keet's Estate, 15 Cal. 2d 328, 1oo P.2d 1045 (1940); State ex rel, Del-
moe v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 1oo Mont. 131, 46 P.2d 39 (1935);
Annot., 19i6E L.R.A. 316; 1 Freeman, Judgments § 363 (5th ed. 1925); 9 Texas L.
Rev. 254 (1931).
2i5o N.E.2d at 365.
"See Foltz v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 60 Fed. 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1894); Olson v. Hoff-
man, 4 F.2d 263, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1924); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 112 Cal. App. 691,
297 Pac. 589, 591 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Friend v. Northern Trust Co., 314 Ill. App.
596, 42 N.E.2d 330, 334-35 (1942); 1 Freeman, Judgments § 365 (5th ed. 1925); 1
Black, Judgments § 171 (1891); 14 Am. Jur. Courts § 162 (1938).
1"'The complaint thus shows affirmatively on its face that the habitual drunken-
ness alleged could not possibly have existed for the space of two years subsequent to
the marriage and prior to the date of filing the complaint for divorce and the
granting of a decree therefor. Hence the complaint does not allege a 'case for di-
vorce' allowed by our Divorce Act, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction
of the cause." 15o N.E.2d at 364.
"Though stated in terms of statement of a cause of action, this authority seems
applicable as it refers to statutory enactments, or indicates they may so apply. "As
a general rule, sometimes expressed in statutory enactments, the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense relied on as a ground for divorce or separation should be
19591
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tion advanced by the dissenting judges seems to reflect the orthodox
view of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They apparently construed
the general class of cases to mean simply "a divorce action."'16 Under
this construction of the term, any ground which sufficiently informs
the court that a divorce is the relief sought would bring a case within
that general class of cases. In other words, factual averments in the
pleadings which satisfy or fail to satisfy specific statutory conditions
to the divorce ground are immaterial in any consideration of jurisdic-
tion of subject matter.17 Of course, the court may err with reference to
its rulings on these statutory modifications, as it did in the principal
case, but such error does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.' 8
Although the majority and the minority speak primarily in terms
of the statement of, or failure to state, a cause of action,19 it would
appear this is simply another method of determining what is meant
by jurisdiction over the subject matter. The majority, which espoused
the narrow construction of "the general class of cases," required the
statement of a good cause of action in the pleadings before jurisdic-
tion attached.2 0 In order for a good cause of action to be stated, the
specifically alleged...." 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 1o8 (1941). See also Jacobs v. Jacobs,
45 Del. 544, 76 A.2d 742 (Super. Ct. 1950); Jones v. Jones, 38 Del. 162, 189 Ad. 588
(Super. Ct. 1937); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 93 Fla. 261, -1 So. 637 (1927); Crenshaw v.
Crenshaw, 120 Mont. 190, 182 P.2d 477 (1947).
"After stating that the trial court had jurisdiction of persons in the principal
case, the dissent disclosed that the trial court had "general jurisdiction over divorce
proceedings by statute." i5o N.E.2d at 365. The dissent then admitted the error
in the decree which was due to the improper measurement of the period of drunk-
enness; but declared such error not of the nature to void the decree. It would seem
reasonable to conclude that the dissent did not believe the statutory time period an-
nexed to the divorce ground essential to the above-mentioned general jurisdiction
over divorce.
1',"Jurisdiction of a court to hear and determine a cause does not depend upon
actual facts alleged but upon authority to determine the existence or nonexistence of
such facts and render judgment according to such finding." People ex rel. Court-
ney v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198, 192 N.E. 908, 912 (1934). Cf. Chernow v. Chernow, 128
Cal. App. 2d 816, 276 P.2d 622 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
"8"It would not be logical to say that jurisdiction attached only where the de-
cision was right. It can make do difference how erroneous the decision may be; if
the court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter, its determination of
the controversy is not void...." Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ezell, 14 S.W.2d
1o18, 1019 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929). See Parker Bros. v. Fagan, 68 F.2d 616 (5 th
Cir. 1934); In re James Estate, 99 Cal. 374, 33 Pac. 1122 (1893); Friend v. Northern
Trust Co., 314 Ill. App. 596, 42 N.E.2d 330 (1942); Head v. Daniels, 38 Kan. 1, 15
Pac. 911 (1887); Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S.W. 42 (1927); Frankfurth
v. Anderson, 61 Wis. 107, 20o N.W. 662 (1884); Van Fleet, Collateral Attack § 61
(1892).
39x5o N.E.2d at 364, 366.
"°Cases cited note 15 supra. See particularly Bennett v. Bennett, 133 W. Va.
179, 70 S.E.2d 894 (1952).
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court required that the specific allegations satisfy the statutory con-
ditions attached to any divorce ground. The dissent maintained that
the statement of a good cause of action, or of any cause of action at
all, was unrelated to any issue of jurisdiction and only required the
pleadings to show that a case for divorce was intended. 21 Such a broad
view of the pleadings parallels the dissent's liberal interpretation
of "the general class of cases" terminology used in the definition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a court, therefore, is de-
ciding whether a cause of action must be stated before jurisdiction
can attach, it is in truth announcing its meaning of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
While lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for a collateral
attack on a decree, it does not, of course, follow that every attack on
jurisdiction is necessarily collateral in nature.22 In the principal case
both the majority and the minority treated the action as a collateral
attack on the original circuit court decree. Such an interpretation ap-
pears debateable. An Illinois statute did prohibit the setting aside of
any judgment after the expiration of thirty days unless the judgment
was void.23 It is true that this statute necessitated the use of some
ground by the plaintiff which would render the decree null and void:
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case. But the fact
that jurisdiction was utilized as the basis for the suit cannot, of itself,
change an attack from direct to collateral.
A direct attack on a decree is usually described as one with the
exclusive purpose of vacating the decree, 24 whereas a collateral attack
is one in which the vacating is secondary-collateral-to the- relief
desired.25 Of all the factors which have been advanced to ascertain the
-115o N.E.2d at 366. This position is consistent with the prevailing view. Foltz
v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 6o Fed. 316 (8th Cir. 1894); Manley v. Park, 62 Kan. 553,
64 PaC. 28 (19o); 1 Black, Judgments § 269 (1891). However, there is contra authority
that at least some cause of action must be stated. See Annot., 19i6E L.R.A. 316, 323
& n.i8.
-Mitchell v. Village Creek Drainage Dist., 158 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1946); In re
Baender's Will, 81 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
"Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 72 (1955).
24City of Des Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 Ill. 475, 5o N.E.2d 483 (1943); Lucas
v. Lucas, 65 Okla. 96, 163 Pac. 943 (1916); 1 Freeman, Judgments § 3o6 (5th ed. 1925).
See generally Annot., 19 18D L.R.A. 47
o .
2-Annot., i918D L.R.A. 470, 472 n.5. But the definition of collateral attack given
in the Restatement of Judgments is extremely broad: "Where a judgment is attacked
in other ways than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or re-
versed or modified or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the
attack is a 'collateral attack.'" Restatement, Judgments § 11, comment a (1942).
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character of the proceeding,26 this purpose test is probably the most
common.27 Since the express purpose of the principal case was to
vacate the initial divorce decree in the very court in which it was en-
tered, it would appear that Collins v. Collins constituted a direct
attack on the original decree.28 However, in applying this same test
to the action by plaintiff's second husband to dissolve their marriage,
there would seem to be little doubt that his action was a collateral
attack on the original decree obtained by plaintiff from William Col-
lins. In the latter proceeding, the vacating of the original decree was
collateral to the annulment of the second marriage.
The principal case indicates that some of the inconsistency and
vagueness surrounding these basic terms can be traced to judicial
interpretation of procedural statutes. Mr. Justice Holmes, in speaking
of the possible difficulty which a court encounters in determining
whether a statute applies to jurisdiction or the substantive rules which
guide its decision, stated that the courts are slow to interpret the
statute as one affecting jurisdiction.29 If the court in the principal
case had taken this attitude in interpreting the affect of the two-year
provision in the Illinois divorce statute, a different result might have
been reached.
ADDENDUM
Both the majority and minority opinions were modified following
the denial of a petition for rehearing. 30 The revised opinion of the
court omitted entirely the "lack of jurisdiction" argument and based
its conclusion on the narrower ground that the decree evidenced
error on its face. The revised dissenting opinion admitted that the
omission of the jurisdictional ground by the majority eliminated
the point at which the original dissent was directed, but it still did
not agree that error appeared on the face of the record. Although the
"IFreeman lists the impeaching of a prior action by fact allegations outside
the record as a feature of a collateral attack according to many decisions, as well
as an attack outside the original proceedings or after the period required by law
to bring an attack. 1 Freeman, Judgments § 306 (5 th ed. 1925).
'TCombs v. Deaton, 199 Ky. 477, 251 S.W. 638 (1925). The difficulty in proper-
ly designating proceedings as direct or collateral has caused writers to comment
that "[e]xcept in the light of some ... particular purpose, attempted distinctions
are probably futile." Arnold & James, Cases on Trials, Judgments and Appeals 157
(1956).
'See Annot., 19i8D L.R.A. 47o, 474 n.io.
"Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 254-35 (i9o8).
314 Ill. 2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958).
